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                                                         Abstract 
Developing a model in which heterogeneity arises among two groups of fundamentalists 
that follow gurus, we focus on the dynamic effects of increasing heterogeneity. We show 
that an increasing degree of heterogeneity leads firstly (i) to insurgence of a pitchfork 
bifurcation and, secondly (ii) generates, together with a larger reaction to misalignment 
of both market makers and agents, the appearance of a periodic, or even, chaotic, price 
fluctuation (trough an homoclinic bifurcation, [1]).  
 
 
JEL: C61, G11, G12, D84 









Corresponding author: Giorgio Ricchiuti, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Facoltà di Economia, Università 
degli Studi di Firenze, via delle pandette 9, 50127, Firenze (Italy)  
giorgio.ricchiuti@unifi.it  
   2
1. Introduction  
In a seminal paper Kirman [2] showed that the choice of one “representative” standard 
utility maximizing individual “is not simply an analytical convenience […], but is both 
unjustified and leads to conclusions which are usually misleading and often wrong”. A 
clear demonstration of this statement has been given in the last decade by an increasing 
number of theoretical works on financial markets. Indeed, in this kind of models, price 
fluctuations are related with the interactions between agents that stabilize the market 
(fundamentalists) and those that introduce instability to the system (chartists) 
([3],[4],[5],[6], see [7] for a complete survey]. Moreover, price fluctuations can derive 
from a switching mechanism that moves agents from fundamentalist and chartist trading 
rule ([8] and [9]): an evolutionary competition generates fluctuations that may be 
triggered by differences in beliefs and amplified by dynamics between different schemes.  
 
Our main aim is to show how an increasing heterogeneity affects price fluctuations. 
Despite the canonical framework, in this paper heterogeneity arise among agents that 
follow the same trading rule: they are all fundamentalists that perceive a different 
fundamental value. Particularly, as in [10] our model “involves agents who may use one 
of a number of predictor which they might obtain from [two] financial gurus” (experts). 
Agents can switch from one expert to the other following an adaptive belief system. 
Mainly, agents’ switch is driven by experts’ ability, approximated by the distance 
between fundamental value and price.  A switching mechanism, based on square error, is 
employed: the less the margin of square error, the higher the quota of agents that 
emulate that expert.  
 
We strongly aware that chartists are an essential figure of the modern financial markets, 
nonetheless our aim is to stress that heterogeneity – in the fundamental value perceived 
– may be a key factor in explaining price fluctuations. Recently, De Grauwe and   3
Kaltwasser [11]
1 have analysed the coexistence of different fundamental values in the 
foreign exchange market. However, their switching mechanism is based on profitability, 
secondly they have chartists in analysis, moreover they assume that supply and demand 
are always equal and the former is exogenous. Finally, while they use extensively 
simulations we have also an analytical approach.  
 
Defining the degree of heterogeneity as the difference between fundamental values we 
show, mainly, that an increasing degree leads firstly (i) to the insurgence of a pitchfork 
bifurcation and, secondly (ii) generate, together with a larger reaction to misalignment of 
both market makers and agents, the appearance of a periodic, or even, chaotic, price 
fluctuation (trough an homoclinic bifurcation, [1]). After presenting the model, we will 
discuss in section three the conditions necessary for existence, the stability of fixed 
points when there is homogeneity and, in section four, how a positive degree of 
heterogeneity affects the insurgence of a pitchfork bifurcation and the transition to a 
homoclinic bifurcation. Finally last section provides brief concluding remarks ad 
suggestions for further research.  
 
 
2. The Model   
We assume that there are two gurus that extract independently, from information related 
to the economic system, two fundamental values. Moreover, they are imitated by other 
operators, which can switch from one expert to the other. Mainly, experts’ ability, 
approximated by the distance between fundamental value and price, drive the agents’ 
switching process. Market makers mediate in transactions, setting prices in reply to 
excess demand (supply). We explore a model with two assets ([9] and [13]): one risky 
and one risk free. A perfectly elastic supply and a gross return (R>1) characterize the 
risk-free asset. Moreover, a price ex-dividend ( t X ) and a (stochastic) dividend process 
                                                 
1  Even, Ferreira et al. [12], using a variation of the minority game, have analyzed the interaction among 
speculators who disagree about fundamental prices.  
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( t y ) represent the key elements of the risky asset. Defining i=1,2 the two experts their 
wealth is expressed as follows:  
t i t t t t i t i q RX y X RW W , 1 1 , 1 , ) ( − + + = + + +                     ( 1 )    
where the fundamentalist i  purchases at time t  shares of risky asset  t i q , . Given wealth 
expectations ( t i E , ) and a constant variance over time (
2
, σ = t i V ), the demand for 
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We assume that they have a common expectations on dividends 
(
_
1 1 , ) ( ) ( y y E y E t t t t i = = + + ) and future prices ( i t t t t i F X E X E = = + + ) ( ) (
*
1 1 , ). It is worth noting 
that  i F  represent the benchmark fundamental values detected by the experts analyzing 
economic factors. The assumption of common expectations on dividend is restrictive. 
However, the qualitative dynamic behaviour of the model is not modified but this 
assumption
2. Hence, equation (3) can be rewritten as follows: 
) ( , t i t i P F q − =α                ( 3 b )  





=  is the positive coefficient of reaction for investors, 
that is negatively related to risk aversion. Given symmetry in the model, for simplicity we 
assume 2 1 F F ≤ . As in [3] the price of the asset follows a market maker mechanism 
where out of equilibrium exchanges are possible. Particularly, market makers apply the 
following rule: 
                                                 
2 Different beliefs alter mainly the halfway steady state, without having any impact on dynamics, because this is 
unstable and detect only the basins of attractions of coexistent attractors.    5
() [ ] 1 , 2 1 1 , 1 1 1 1 + + + + + − + + = t t t t t t q w q w P P β                               (4)  
where  β  is the positive speed of adjustment and  1 + t w  is the proportion of agents that 
imitate expert 1. This depends on the distance between the fundamentals and  t P . 
Particularly, agents imitate more the expert whose prediction is closer to  t P .  
Let  t i SE ,  be the square errors of the two experts:  
()
2
1 , 1 t t P F SE − =                                                     (5)  
()
2
2 , 2 t t P F SE − =                                                    (6)  
Using an adaptive rational mechanism,  1 + t w  can be defined as a frequency:  
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where  γ  represents, as in [8] and [9], the agent’s transfer speed between the two 
experts’ advice.  Similarly to [14] the switching mechanism is based on the accurateness 
of forecast. However his mechanism is built looking at differences between chartists and 
fundamentalist. Mainly in his model agents prefer chartist strategy “according to the 
difference between the squared prediction errors of each strategy”. Even the mechanism 
employed by [15] is based on ability agents’ prediction; particularly they assume that the 
larger deviation of current price from fundamental values the greater is the quota of 
agents that opt for the chartist’s strategy.   
 
In our case the quota of agents that follow expert i  depends on the relative distance 
between the corresponding fundamental value,  i F  and the current price. However this 
mechanism is not a clear-cut: when the fundamental value  i F  is equal to current price,   6
in the next period a share of agents still follow the  j  expert. This implies that the quota 
varies from zero to one, with extremes not included.   
Substituting (3b), (8) in (4) the following dynamic price equation can be achieved:  
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where  0 1 2 ≥ − = ∆ F F F  represents the degree of heterogeneity.  
 
 
3. Homogeneous Fundamentalists  
 
Proposition 1. When  0 = ∆F  there is a unique fixed point: F P = . This steady state is 
globally stable if and only if reaction coefficients are low, particularly if  2 < αβ . 




= . Finally, a divergence 
to infinity arises if  2 > αβ .   
 
Proof.  
For  0 = ∆F , equation (9) can be re-written as:  
() t t t P F P P − + = + αβ 1                               (10) 
which is a linear map. A steady state condition is implied, particularly when 
*
1 P P P t t = = +  
and then ( )
* * * P F P P − + = αβ . That is when  F P =
* : the unique steady state of the 










                                 (11) 
given that α  and β  are positive,  the steady state is globally stable if and only if   
2 < αβ  □ 
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In figure 1 we show the quite simple dynamical behaviour when there is homogeneity. 
We set  2 = F ,   2 = α  and  1 0 = P , analysing the dynamic of equation (10) with different 
values of the market maker reaction coefficient, β . Figure 1a and 1b respectively show 
the case in which there is global stability with monotonic or oscillatory convergence.  
Figure 1 – Dynamics with Homogeneity 
 
Note  2 = F ,   2 = α  and  1 0 = P  
 
Moreover, figure 1c we represents the particular set of parameters that determines a 
period-two cycle and finally figure 1d reports the divergence to infinity. Therefore, 
linearity implies a monotonically or oscillatory convergence when both market makers 
and agents do not overreact to misalignment. Otherwise, a divergence to infinity occurs.  
Only if the product of the reaction coefficients is exactly equal one, can there be a regime 
of two period cycles.   8
4. A Positive Degree of Heterogeneity  
A richer dynamical behaviour arise when the degree of heterogeneity is strictly positive, 
0 > ∆F . Even if, as usual, reaction’s coefficients play a central role in determines the 
chaotic behaviour of the system, they do not affect the existence of steady states. 
Indeed, the degree of heterogeneity and the transfer speed will determine a pitchfork 
bifurcation.  
 
Proposition 2. Given map (9), when the degree of heterogeneity is positive,  0 > ∆F :  
(i)  The set of steady states belong to the interval ( ) 2 1,F F ; 
(ii) there exists at least a fixed point,
2
2 1 F F
PM
+
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that  can be rewritten as follows:  
( )





1 2 exp F F P F
P F
P F
− − ∆ =
−
−
− γ                              (13)  
The LHS crosses the x-axis in  1 F  and has an asymptote for  2
* F P = . The RHS is a 
positive increasing exponential function. Given that the RHS is always positive, 
straightforward algebra, the possible values for 
* P  belong to the interval () 2 1,F F . 
Moreover, whatever happens RHS crosses the LHS for a value that is less than the 
asymptote,  2 F : there is at least a steady state,  particularly it is 
2
2 1 F F
PM
+
=  □ 
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Proposition 3. Given map (9), when the degree of heterogeneity is positive,  0 > ∆F :  
(i)  if there is a unique steady state, M P , given the degree of heterogeneity and 
intensity of switching there is a value  ) , 0 ( αβ αβ ∈  such as the map (9) is globally 
stable;  
(ii)  given the intensity of switching, γ  , there exists a positive degree of heterogeneity, 
F ∆ , such as there is a pitchfork bifurcation: the initial unique steady state become 
unstable and two new steady states,  L P  and  H P , arise, with  H M L P P P < < ;  
 
Proof.  
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γαβ αβ                     (14) 
with a low enough degree of heterogeneity and intensity of switching, such as there is a 
unique steady state, there exists an interval  ) , 0 ( αβ  for which the dynamic map is a 
contraction, and therefore the steady state is globally stable. Finally, to evaluate the 
stability properties of the unique steady state we work out the equation (14) for 
M P P =
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Specifically,  M P  can lose its stability through a flip bifurcation if   2 > αβ  and 
2 ) ( F ∆ γ  is 
small.   10












γ αβ  t h a t  i s  w h e n  
γ
2
= ∆F .  Hence given the intensity of switching, γ , there exists a positive degree of 
heterogeneity,  F ∆ , such as there is a pitchfork bifurcation: the initial unique steady 
state become unstable and two new steady states,  L P  and  H P  arise, with  H M L P P P < <  
□ 
 
It is worth noting that: a) the higher is the intensity of switching, the lower is the degree 
of heterogeneity for which the pitchfork bifurcation arises; b) uniqueness can be achieved 
even if there is heterogeneity; c) a higher degree of heterogeneity or an increase of γ  
lead to the insurgence of new steady states which are closer to the fundamental values. 
Indeed, given equation (13), a larger  F ∆  implies a lower intercept and a deeper slope of 
the RHS. Hence it crosses the LHS firstly closer to  1 F  and secondly intersect the LHS 
function for an higher value of 
* P , that is closer to the asymptote,  2 F . 
Figure 2 A low degree of heterogeneity 
 
Note:   1 ; 1 . 1 ; 7 ; 8 ; 8 . 0 1 2 = = = = = β α γ F F    11
To shed some light on what really happen in the market, figures (3a) and (3b) report a 
case in which either an increase in heterogeneity or an increase in the speed of transfer 
lead to a pitchfork bifurcation. Particularly, in figure (3a) when  8 . 0 = λ  the pitchfork 
bifurcation arises for  58 . 1 = ∆F ; while for figure (3b) when  1 = ∆F  there are two new 
stable steady for  2 = λ .  
Figure 3 Pitchfork Bifurcation through an increase of the degree of heterogeneity (a) or through an 
increase in the transfer speed (b) 
 
a)  1 ; 1 . 1 ; 6 ; 8 ; 8 . 0 1 2 = = = = = β α γ F F    b) 1 ; 1 . 1 ; 7 ; 8 ; 3 1 2 = = = = = β α γ F F  
Proposition 4.  
For a low enough value of α ,  β ,  γ , the initial conditions belonging to the interval             
[0,  M P ) the price converges at the lowest steady state  L P ; alternatively when the initial 
conditions lie in the interval ( M P , ∞), it converges to the highest steady state  H P . 
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2 1 1                ( 1 7 )  
where  () γ , , 2 1 F F f R = , it is straightforward that for each combination of parameters 
( 2 1, , F F γ ), a value αβ  exists in such a way that the first derivate is always equal to 
more than zero. Hence the map of the dynamical system is monotonic and therefore 
invertible. Hence, the initial conditions belonging to the interval  ) [ M P , 0  converge at the   12
lowest fundamental value  L P ; alternatively when the initial conditions lie in the interval 
() ∞ , M P , they converge to the highest fundamental value  H P  □  
 
By using numerical simulations we now explore the particular route to homoclinic 
bifurcation. Given that the map is symmetric in relation to  M P , dynamically all qualitative 
changes (bifurcations, stability/instability, etc.) around the fixed points,  L P  and  H P , 
occur due to the same set of parameters. We set up parameters as follows 
1 . 1 ; 6 ; 8 ; 8 . 0 1 2 = = = = α γ F F , increasing the reaction coefficient of the market makers, 
β . Particularly, for  3 = β  a period-doubling bifurcation arises and there are two 
symmetric stable cycles of period two (figure 4). However, further growth of β  leads 
initially to a new attractive period-four cycles, which is followed by a two symmetric 
chaotic attractors.  
Figure 4 Flip Bifurcation 
 
Note   3 ; 1 . 1 ; 6 ; 8 ; 8 . 0 1 2 = = = = = β α γ F F  
Economically, starting from an excess in demand ( 1 F P o < ), the overreaction of the 
market makers leads to a large price increase in such a way that the price becomes 
higher than  L P . An excess in demand is transformed into an excess in supply. Even in   13
this case, given a high β , agents that follow expert 1 supply a bulky quantity that leads 
the price down, particularly less than  L P  . Hence the system fluctuates between excess 
of demand and excess of supply at round the steady state  L P . Different authors have 
illustrated (i.e. [1]), that homoclinic bifurcation occurs when a local maximum and 
minimum are mapped in the unstable steady state  M P . In figure (5) we show that for 
4.03 ≈ β  a homoclinic bifurcation emerges.  The new structure of the basins produced 
implies the synthesis between the basins of the two fundamental values: bull and bear 
price fluctuations appear. Finally we all the (symmetric) dynamical behaviours are clearly 
shown through the bifurcation diagram for β  (figure6).  
Figure 5 Homoclinic Bifurcation 
 
Note  031 . 4 ; 1 . 1 ; 6 ; 8 ; 8 . 0 1 2 = = = = = β α γ F F    14
Figure 6 Bifurcation diagram for  [ ] 5 , 3 ∈ β  
 
Note  [ ] 5 , 3 ; 1 . 1 ; 6 ; 8 ; 8 . 0 1 2 ∈ = = = = β α γ F F  
It is worth summing up the route to chaos analysing the effects of an increasing 
heterogeneity. We reported in Figure 7 the effects of an increasing degree of 
heterogeneity. We set up parameters as follows  3 . 2 ; 1 ; 1 . 0 = = = β α γ . Given proposition 
1, for  0 = ∆F  there is a flip bifurcation; it is interesting that in this case the insurgence 
of heterogeneity does not entail the instantly insurgence of multiple equilibriums: on the 
contrary a low degree of heterogeneity, given this parameters, stabilizes the system. 
However, given propositions discussing above a pitchfork bifurcation arises for 
47 . 4 ≈ ∆F . A further increases of heterogeneity leads to a flip bifurcation and then to an 
homoclinic bifurcation.  
   15
Figure 7 - Increasing Degree of Heterogeneity  [ ] 17 , 0 ∈ ∆F  
 
Note  3 . 2 ; 1 ; 1 . 0 = = = β α γ  
 
5. Conclusion 
Heterogeneity in financial markets has been developed in various models which have 
aided in explaining the intraday financial market dynamics. Unlike canonical models we 
focus on agents with the same trading rules (i.e. fundamentalists) where heterogeneity 
depends on different fundamental values, agents can move from expert to the other 
following a switching mechanism. We show that an increasing degree of heterogeneity 
leads firstly (i) to insurgence of a pitchfork bifurcation and, secondly (ii) together with a 
larger reaction to misalignment of both market makers and agents to generate a period 
doubling. Our simple switch mechanism is based on the distance between current price 
and fundamental values, a further interesting development would be to analyze the 
dynamics generated by heterogeneity in the case of profitability based imitative process. 
In this paper we show that complex dynamics can also arise if all agents act as 
fundamentalists that do not agree on the fundamental value. Particularly, market 
instability and periodic, or even, chaotic price fluctuations can be generated.   
Heterogeneity plays a central role in economics (i.e. [16]) and it is able to explain market 
dynamics.  
Since our switching mechanism is based on the distance between current price and 
fundamental values, it would be interesting to analyze the dynamics generated by   16
heterogeneity in the case of profitability based imitative process and with the presence of 
chartists. Finally, as attempted by [17], we will try to identify the three canonical 
patterns for bubbles and crashes identified by [18] from a series of famous speculative 
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